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COVENANTS FOR TITLE.
Real and Personal Covenants.
A covenant is either real or personal. It is real when
a man binds himself to pass a real thing, as lands or tene-
ments ; or where it runs with the land, so that one who has
the land has the covenant or holds the land subject to the
covenant. Thus all covenants real, are those 'which have
for their object something annexed to, or inherent in, or con-
nected with the land, or other real property.' A covenant is
personal when it attaches to the person and some person in
particular shall be benefitted by, or charged with it.
The essential difference between a real and personal cov-
enant is, that a real covenant runs with the land, and ex-
tends to all who claim under the grantee, and it is also trans-
Therefore, where a covenant real is
entered into by a grantee or lessee, it will not only bind
such grantee or lessee, but also his assignee ; and the gran-
tor or lessor, or his heir may at any time bring an action on
such covenant. ( 2 Greenleaf's Cruise R. P. 756.) It is
not so with a personal covenant ; the real covenant may bind
an unnamed assignee, but the personal covenant does not run
with the land, and is binding only upon the covenantor and his
personal representatives, and in favor of the covenantee.
American and English Rule.
The covenants for title are five in number, viz : cove-
nant for quiet enjoyment ; against incumbrances ; that the
grantor will warrant and defend the title ; the covenant for
seisin, and that the grantor has a good right to convey. The
ferred to a purchaser.
covenant for further assurance is still used in England, but
it is practically unknown to the American conveyancer. In
England all of these covenants are held to run with the land.
(Rawl. Coy., 4 ed. 324.) The greater part of the United
States, however, do not follow this rule. In a general way
it may be said, that the covenants of warranty and of quiet
enjoyment are real, run with the land and are binding upon
subsequent assignees ; the covenants of seisin, of right to
convey, and against incumbrances, are personal, do not run
with the land and are not binding upon subsequent assignees.
(III Wash. R. P. 448 ; 4 Kent's Com. 471.) The exceptions
to this rule will be given under the separate discussion of
each covenant.
The Covenant o f Warranty.
The operation and effect of this covenant was known long
before the introduction of deeds as a mode of transferring
real property and authenticating the sale or transfer of lands.
It was an incident of tenure, created without express contract.
Under the feudal system, when the lord or grantor conveyed
land to his vassal it was a mutual benefit act ; the vassal to
render homage to his lord, and the lord to protect and defend
him in the occupancy of his fief.
reciprocal.
Warranty and homage were
Before the age of written instruments of convey-
ance, the mere granting of a fief bound the giver to warran-
ty ; when written instruments of conveyance were first intro-
duced, the word "dedi implied warranty, and it was not neces-
sary to state therein the word 'warranty" to obtain the bene-
fit of this covenant.
To the statutes Ae 4b mis (1276) and qr e may
be directly traced the introduction of express warranties in-
to deeds. The statute q etore. prohibited the subinju-
dation of fee simple estates and provided that they should be
holden of the lord or original donor only ; thus there was no
tenure between the lord and the grantee of his grantee ; and
by the terms of the statute dje biai, which says, 'where is
contained 'dedi et n es, to be holden of the chief lord
of the fee or of others, and not of feoffors or any of their
heirs, reserving no service, without homage or the aforesaid
clause, their heirs shall not be bounden to warranty, notwith-
standing the feoffer during his own life, by force of his own
gift, shall be bound to warranty', the second grantee was un-
protected by the covenant of warranty, which before had been
implied, the statute having abolished the tenure on which it
depended. This made necessary the introduction of express
warranties to protect the interests of the subsequent gran-
tees.
Rights of the class represented by the ancient warranty,
and now by the usual covenants for title, are pure matters
of contract, and from a very early date down to comparatively
modern times lawyers have been perplexed with the question
how an assignee could sue upon a contract to which he was not
a party. But an heir could sue upon a warranty of his ances-
tor, because for that purpose he was,under the statute of des-
cent, in the same place as his ancestor. And the conception
was gradually extended in a qualified way to assigns when they
were mentioned in the deed. It is hard to say just when this
breach was closed, as we remember that the burden of an ordi-
nary warranty in fee did not fall upon a devisee, although it
might upon an heir as representing the person of his ancestor.
This covenant is the most important one in the United
States. By the Laws of New York, 1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1, 'A
covenant that the grantor 'will forever warrant the title' to
the said premises shall be construed as meaning that the gran-
tor and his heirs, or successors, the premises granted, and
every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances, unto
the grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns, against the
grantor and his heirs or successors, and against all and every
person or persons whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the
same shall and will warrant and forever defend.' It is set-
tled beyond a doubt that this covenant runs
(M.thel1 lv. Warner, 5 Conn. 497 ; Brady v.
478 ; Blakwell v. Atkinson, 14 Cal. 470 ;
54 III. 487 ; Whitney v. -zismor , 6 Cush.
with the land.
Sr , 27 Ill.
Wead v. LXkin.,
124 ; KiZv. Ker
5 Ohio, 155 ; Suyamv. Jones, 10 Wend. 180 ; Th eskoff v.
Erras_' Lan =L Trust Co., 58 Barb. 36. )
This covenant is broken only by eviction. (Miller v.
Watson, 5 Cow. 195 ; ent v. Welfh, 7 Johns. 258.) Evict-
ion is either actual or constructive. It is actual when a
grantee is dispossessed by process of law. It is construc-
tive when he yields possession to a title which is actually
paramount. As long as he remains in possession, there is
neither ; and in order to maintain an action for breach of a
covenant of warranty, one or the other must be shown. (MI.d
v. Stackpole, 40 Hun, 473. See limitation of this rule in
Justice Swayne's opinion, post. ) The evidence must clear-
ly establish one or the other. (Gardner v. McCarthy, 3 Hill,
330 ; VanderKarr v. Yder .rr, 11 Johns. 122 ; Emerson v.
Proprietors, etc., 1 Mass. 464.) It was at one time held
that to constitute an eviction, 'there must be a disturbance
of the premises by legal process.' Such is not now the rule.
Possession, without a struggle to maintain it, may be surren-
dered to one having a paramount title, with the same rights
to resort to the grantor's covenants of warranty that would
have been brought about by an eviction under process of law.
(Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill, 643-645-646 ; Cowdry v. C ,
44 N. Y. 392.) As where the grantor has no title to the
land embraced within the lines of the description, the gran-
tee may recover for the deficiency in an action upon the cove-
nant of warranty. (Robinson v. Robinson, 19 Weekly Digest,
188.) If the public have an easement only in land, as the
right to use it as a highway, and the grantor should convey
such land by deed, and should have contained in the deed a
covenant of warranty, the existence of the easement would not
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amount to a breach of that covenant. (III Wash. R. P., 4 ed.,
460 ; Whitbebk v. Cook, 15 Johns. 483 ; Jackson v. Hathaway,
15 Johns. 447.) It must be deemed the settled doctrine in
this State that the fact that a part of land conveyed with a
covenant of warranty was at the time of the conveyance a high-
way, and used as such, is not a breach of this covenant. This
is so, for the reason that the grantee must be presumed to
have known of the existence of a public easement and purchased
upon a consideration in reference to the situation in that re-
spect. (Hymes v. Esty, 116 N. Y. 501 ; Huyck v. Andrews., 113
N. Y. 85.) Pennsylvania is in harmony with this doctrine.
(Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Penn. St. 229.)
Covenant for Quiet Enjoyment.
In one of the early cases (Howell v. Richards, 11 East.
634), this covenant is described as "special and particular
in its terms as well as general.' By the Laws of New York,
1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1, 'A covenant that the grantee 'shall
quietly enjoy the said premises' shall be construed as mean-
ing that such grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns,
shall and may, at all times thereafter, peaceably and quiet-
ly have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy the said premi-
ses, and every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances,
without any let, suit, trouble, molestation, eviction or dis-
turbance of the grantor, his heirs, successors or assigns, or
any person or persons lawfully claiming or to claim the same.'
The English and American cases are uniform in holding that
this covenant runs with the land. (Campbell v. Lewis, 3 Barn.
& Ald. 392 ; Lo2a v. Moulder, 1 Ark. 313 ; S. C. 33 Am. Dec.
338 ; Biddoe v. WadsrtL, 21 Wend. 120 ; Limited by 65 N. Y.
587 ; Hunt v. Aidon, 4 Hill, 354.)
There has been considerable controversy among the cases
as to the kind of eviction necessary to support an action for
a breach of this covenant. In Platt on Covenants, it is
said : "To qualify a party to support an action on a covenant
for quiet enjoyment, some positive act of molestation or some
act amounting to a prohibition of enjoyment must be shown."
But the court, in Shattuck v. Lab (65 N. Y. 500), says : 'It
is not to be understood that an ouster or expulsion must take
place in order to found a suit ; it is enough that the quiet
enjoyment of the covenantee be invaded or prevented. As
where at the time of the execution of the deed the premises
are in the possession of a third person, holding under a para-
mount title, and the grantee in consequence is defeated in
legal proceedings to obtain possession, and is kept out of
possession, this is a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment. It is not necessary that the grantee should make him-
self a trespasser and be ousted, in order to support an ac-
tion on this covenant. (Shattuck v. Lab, supra ; Park v.
Bates, 12 Vt. 381 ; Duval v. C , 2 Wheat. 621.) As where
a person takes a deed with a covenant for the quiet enjoyment
of land, with a house thereon, and it turns out that a third
person has title to the house, which he removes, it would be
a breach of this covenant. (Funk v. Creswell, 5 Iowa, 88 ;
Mot v. FImr, 1 N. Y. 564 ; Scriver v. Smith, 100 N. Y. 471)
In Noonan v. Sith, 2 Black, (U. S.), Mr. Justice Swayne
says : "In all cases where there is adverse possession by vir-
ture of a paramount title, such possession is regarded as e-
viction and involves a breach of the covenant of warranty or
of quiet enjoyment.' This is the. rule given in Shattuck v.
Lamb (supra), which overrules many of the early New York de-
cisions that hold actual eviction necessary. Where premises
are conveyed with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, and there is
at the time of such conveyance an outstanding title to an ease-
ment, which materially impairs the value of the premises and
interferes with the use and possession of some portion there-
of, the covenant of quiet enjoyment is broken, although there
is no technical physical ouster. In this case a land owner
below the land which was conveyed, by virtue of a paramount
title in the nature of an easement, raised the height of a
dam upon his land, thereby flooding the land that was convey-
ed ; this was held an eviction.
In the case of Green v. Collin (86 N. Y. 246), there was
an artificial easement in question,- an incorporeal heredita-
ment,- and it was held that because it did not belong to the
grantor it did not pass as appurtenant to the land granted,
was not conveyed by the deed, and hence was not within the
scope of the covenant for quiet enjoyment. It has sometimes
been supposed that there was a conflict between the cases of
Green v. C (supra) and Adams v. C (87 N. Y. 422.).
The distinction between the two cases is clear ; in the one
case the grantee got all that was covered by his deed, and
there was no breach of the covenant of warranty or of quiet
enjoyment. In the other case (Adams v. Conover) the grantee
did not get all that was covered by his deed, and there was a
breach of covenant. (Scriver v. Smith, supra.)
The three cases just above cited are the leading New
York cases construing this covenant, and their authority is
unquestioned.
Covenant against Incumbrances.
This covenant is of great importance. It gives to a
grantee protection from an incumbrance upon the land at the
time of its conveyance. By the Laws of New York, 1890, Ch.
475, Sec. 1, it is provided as follows : "A covenant 'that the
said premises are free from incumbrances' shall be construed
as meaning that such premises are free, clear, discharged and
unincumbered of and from all former and other gifts, grants,
titles, charges, estates, judgments, taxes, assessments, liens
and incumbrances of any nature or kind whatsoever.' It is
further provided, in the same section, that : "A covenant that
the grantor 'has not done or suffered anything whereby the
said premises have been incumbered in any way whatsoever'
shall be construed as meaning that the grantor has not made,
done,coimnitted, executed or suffered any act or acts, thing
or things whatsoever, whereby or by means whereof the above
mentioned and described premises, or any part or parcel there-
of, now are, or at any time hereafter shall or may be impeach-
ed, charged or incumbered in any manner or way whatsoever.'
It would seem that this last covenant is in the nature
of a strict covenant against incumbrances, and still is of
the character of a covenant of further assurance. From a
strict construction of the language used, it is evident that
it would run with the land.
never been construed by the co
The act is a recent one and has
urts. With but few exceptions,
the strict covenant against incumbrances is held to be perso-
nal, and broken at once if at all. (Mith elv. W.iarner, 5
Corn. 497 ; W)= v. Ballad, 12 Mass. 304 ; Heath v. Whidden
24 Me. 383 ; I&Qoro v. Merrill, 17 N. H. 75 ; Lhotter v. T o,
6 Vt. 75.) But in Ohio this covenant is held to run with
the land. (Foote v. Burnet, 10 Ohio, 333.) And in Iowa the
sane has been held. (Knadler v. S , 36 Iowa, 232.) The
court, in Foote v. Burnet (supra), says : 'If the first gran-
tee contnues in possession of the land while his title remains
undisturbed, and he conveys to a subsequent grantee, in whose
time an outstanding incumbrance is enforced against the land,
justice requires that this subsequent grantee should have the
benefit of the covenant against incumbrances to indemnify him-
self." The only case cited in support of this theory is
Backus v. McCoy, (3 Ohio, 211.).
The reasoning of the Ohio court is tenable and the opin-
ion one of merit. And if it were not for the precedent, it
might be contended for in this State with success, when we
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remember that all the covenants in a deed are made to the
grantee and his assigns, and the only reason ever given why
the covenant against incumbrances does not run with the land,
or at least why it does not pass to the assigns of the gran-
tee when he conveys, is that such a covenant is broken as soon
as made, and therefore the right to recover on it is only a
chose in action, which at comon law was not assignable. A
covenants against incumbrances to B and his assigns ; a con-
veys and assigns to C all that he received from A_, yet -C gets
no right to recover on the covenant against incumbrances, be-
cause choses in action are not assignable. This reasoning
cannot apply in New York and in those States where choses in
action are assignable. In applying this rule there, a patent
fallacy appears in the premises,-- the restriction against
assigning choses in action is removed, and there is no valid
reason why the rights under this covenant will not pass to a
subsequent grantee.
The rights under this covenant are the most often dis-
puted where there is an unusual tax assessed on the land con-
veyed. If the tax is assessed imediately after the convey-
ance it is









a breach of this covenant. (Huyck v. A,
Even if the covenantor knew of its existence.
Delaney, 40 Fed. 97.) But no tax is a lien until
thereof is ascertained or determined ; this is the
(Lather v. Keoh, 109 N. Y. 583 ; H&rgey v. Down-
Y. 644.) A late case (MkLaughl v. Miller, 125
C. 26 N. E. 1104), is an apparent exception to this
that case the legislature authorized a street im-
provement, and directed the assessors to assess a certain por-
tion of the amount each year 'equally upon the lands fronting
No notice to the property owners was re-
quired. In an action by the grantee against the grantor in
a deed of land abutting on the avenue, for breach of a cove-
nant that the land was free from all charges and assessments,
it appeared that the plaintiff had paid a sumn for such im-
provement, inserted in the assessment rolls prior to the ex-
ecution of the deed, but it was not shown that the assessment
was made by the board of assessors, or that notice was given
the property owners before it was made. And it was held that
the assessment was not a charge on the land ; and that pay-
ment of such assessments for previous years by the grantor did
not estop him, as against his grantee, to deny that the sub-
sequent assessment was a charge on the land. The test prin-
ciple on which to support an action is : "the interest complain
ed of must be valid.'
on the avenue."
Covenant of Seisin.
This covenant is one in which the grantee covenants that
he is seized of the very estate which he purports to convey.
In New York this covenant is construed by statute (Laws of
New York, 1890, Ch. 475, Sec. 1), as follows : 'A covenant
that the grantor 'is seized of the said premises (described)
in fee simple, and has good right to convey the same' shall
be construed as meaning that such grantor at the time of the
execution and delivery of the conveyance is lawfully seized
of a good, absolute and indefeasible estate of inheritance in
fee simple, of and in all and singular the premises thereby
conveyed, with the tenements, hereditaments and appurtenances
thereto belonging, and has good right, full power and lawful
authority to grant and convey the same by the said conveyance."
The general and better rule is that such a covenant is
broken at once if at all. Therefore it is personal and does
not run with the land. (Bingh v. Wla 1 N. Y. 508 ;
McQarthy v. Lkgtt, 3 Hill, 134 ; Hamilton v. Wilson, 4 Johns.
72 ; Bx~dv. burk, 27 Ill. 478 ; Stewart v. Drake, 9 N. J.
L. 139.) But a few States hold it a covenant that runs
with the land, (Sfieldv. Iowa Homestead CQo., 32 Iowa, 317 ;
Backus v. McCoy, 3 Ohio, 211) and in Maine, by statute, it
runs with the land.
The covenant of seisin extends only to a title existing
in a third person and which might defeat the estate granted.
(Fitch v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 161 ; Horrivan v. Rice (Minr.) 38
N. W. 765.) There is a conflict of authority as to the na-
ture of the seisin which would meet the requirements of this
covenant. Some States hold the mere possession of the land
by the covenantor is sufficient, even though he is a disseisin-
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or. (Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 439 ; Backus v. ., 3 Ohio,
211 ; Wilsonv. inha, 51 Me. 566.)
In D v. Suderlnd (17 Ohio, 52), the court says :
"Whether the covenant of seisin was personal or real depended
upon the fact whether the grantor was in possession or not
at the time of the conveyance ; if the grantor was in actual
possession, it attached and ran with the land, and was not
broken until eviction by title paramount ; but if he was not
in actual possession, either in law or in fact, the covenant
was "in p raenti' and personal, and no one could maintain an
action for its breach but the grantee. But this doctrine is
not looked upon with favor, and the States generally adopt
the rule that a covenant for seisin is a covenant that the
grantor has a good and legal title, and that it is broken im-
mediately if the covenantor has no title. (itchell v. Hazen,
4 Conn. 497 ; Hn]itn. v. Wilson, 4 Johns. 72 ; McOarthy v.
Le t, supra ; Bingh a v. Weidernwx, I N. Y. 509 ; Carm v.
.Doup ass, 10 Iowa, 586 ; Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Penn. St. 229.)
Covenant of Right to Convey.
This covenant is in the nature of a covenant for seisin.
It is broken, if at all, imnediately on the execution of the
deed ; it is personal, and does not run with the land. (Brick
ford v. Pa€_, 2 Mass. 455 ; Fowler v. PoinZ, 2 Barb.) The
covenant is of minor importance, but the general rules given
as applicable to the covenant of seisin will apply to this
covenant. The case of canlin v. Allison (12 Kans. 85),
is a good illustration of this covenant. In that case, cer-
tain persons attempted to sell and convey a piece of land, and
covenanted that they had good and lawful authority to sell
the sane, when in fact they had authority to sell and convey
only four undivided fifths. The covenant was broken as soon
as the deed was delivered.
Covenant for Further Assurance.
This covenant is rarely used in this State, the only re-
ported case being that of Colby v. Osgood (29 Barb. 339.) I
was there held to run with the land. It is interpreted in
New York by statute. (See Laws of New York, 1890, Ch. 475,
Sec. 1.)
